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The organization of the Hennebique firm in the countries 
of the Mediterranean Basin: Establishment and communications strategy
Christel Frapier and Simon Vaillant
The eagerness of a reinforced concrete entrepreneur 
like François Hennebique to expand to the countries 
of the Maghreb is easily explained. Rather than repre-
senting an opportunity to experiment with and improve 
his process, the territory offered expansion potential for 
the economic and organizational system he had begun 
setting up from his Paris headquarters in 1896. In open 
competition with a certain number of other construction 
systems in mainland France, he undoubtedly believed 
that his establishment in French colonies would facili-
tate winning government contracts there, and also give 
him access to new markets. The “French Conquest” of 
these countries was in fact recent and the needs were 
immense. Economic, industrial, and tourist development 
did not begin to take root until 1935. In fact Hennebique 
expanded to this region very early, opening one of its 
first agencies in Algiers in 1893, at the same time as its 
French, Swiss, and Italian (Naples) agencies. The case 
of the Egyptian office, opened in Cairo in 1898 under 
the leadership of the engineer Émile Servin, stands out 
from the other countries by the advanced nature of its 
organization, and it became a model for other countries 
of the Mediterranean Basin.41 In obtaining a license42 from 
Hennebique in 1901, Émile Servin indeed benefitted from 
complete autonomy in running the agency and adminis-
tering its affairs. His freedom of action – quite rare for 
agents – is perhaps associated with the observation of 
defects in the roof terraces of the Museum of Egyptian 
Antiquities of Cairo, erected two years earlier. 
The relation between agents and licensees of the Henne-
bique firm was formed around the design and execution 
of works in reinforced concrete which the entrepreneur-
licensee assigned to the engineer-agent. This system was 
the only means for Hennebique to establish its authority 
and to control its production especially abroad. Gener-
ally, the system’s success outside France was based on 
the personality of the engineer-agents and their ability to 
balance their leeway in the field and full compliance with 
the requirements of the central office. Although agents 
representing faraway territories rarely attended the bian-
nual meetings in Paris, but this was undoubtedly for reasons 
of geographical distance. 
Obviously, the exponential expansion of Hennebique’s 
constructions abroad was driven by the growth in the 
number of its local licensees over the years, especially 
after the 1910s. Initially most often limited to a single 
agency and two licensees for each country – which was 
the case for Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt in 1904 – around 
1913 Hennebique increased the number of its licensees 
while it consolidated its Algerian and Tunisian agen-
cies.43 It had nine licensees in Algeria and Tunisia, six 
in Morocco, and five in Egypt. However, in Turkey, Henne-
bique expanded drastically, going from only one agency 
and no licensees in 1904, to 28 licensees managed by 
the Constantinople agency in 1913. The offices enabled 
Hennebique to extend and operate in such distant 
countries as Syria. The Hennebique sales strategy, 
aimed above all at conquering new markets by setting 
up locally, was clearly operating in Turkey in 1912, a 
year marked by two major events: the earthquake at 
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The Hennebique office, Algiers (1927), 
Régnier et Guion, arch.; Louis Grasset, cont. 
(photo by H. Besson)
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Murefte and the beginning of the Balkan War (in which 
the Ottoman Empire became involved in October). By 
opening an agency in the Galata area right in 1912, 
Hennebique was poised to benefit from the economic 
and construction opportunities of a return to peace in 
the near future. Apparently, although the personality and 
the “activism” of its local agent, A. George, enabled it to 
expand its system in situ, official support – especially 
from government ministries – was instrumental in arming 
Hennebique to face strong competition in the field.44 The 
Turkish case is also representative of the situation for 
the majority of agents active abroad between 1900 and 
1920. A first period in which competitiveness and stra-
tegic projects45 – not always executed – aimed to estab-
lish the Hennebique system abroad would be followed 
by a boom in construction so significant that it generally 
overwhelmed the central agency and resulted in logis-
tical dysfunctions. Around the 1920s, the correspondence 
contains many complaints local agents addressed to the 
central office, swamped with a backlog of orders to be 
processed and shipped. Local agents were losing busi-
ness, as a result. 
In Algeria, Hennebique had been established since the 
end of the 19th century. Initially, it entered the sectors 
of civil and military engineering, building bridges and 
hydraulic structures (piers, quays etc.), before responding 
to numerous commissions for public works (hospitals, 
schools, town halls), industrial buildings (silos, reser-
voirs, factories etc.), and private investments (hotels and 
some apartment buildings). Yet it was during the inter-
war period, when the agency in Algiers was constructed 
(touted by Hennebique as the first building in Algeria to 
be made entirely of reinforced concrete),46 that it spread 
its process more broadly and extended its field of action 
to other typologies, especially to offices and apart-
ment buildings. Like the company headquarters on rue 
Danton in Paris, the Hennebique building in Algiers was 
an excellent advertisement for ways to apply reinforced 
concret to civil constructions. Therein lies Hennebique’s 
originality, differentiating it from its competitors. Other 
French construction companies established in Northern 
Africa, particularly reinforced-concrete companies such 
as Fourré & Rhodes, remained confined to the major public 
works sector. Hennebique had set up locally much earlier 
than its competitors, and diversified its offer, applying 
the Hennebique system to all types of buildings. As a 
result, reinforced concrete became one of the essential 
elements in civil construction in both Northern Africa and 
the Middle East. 
Hennebique office, Algiers (1927), Régnier 
et Guion, arch.; Louis Grasset, cont.: The 
office of Hennebique licensee Dop in 1933 
(photo by Henri Eichacker)
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These territories constituted a true opportunity for the 
Hennebique firm, but also for the agents and licensees who 
depended on the system. Thus it was not rare to perceive 
in the various projects the personal strategies of entrepre-
neurs and engineers based in southern France, in Spain or 
in Italy, rather than south of the Mediterranean.47 Besides 
dealing with agents eager to poach business from the North 
African territories, Hennebique was troubled to some extent 
by local labor. Specifications were tight, and compromise 
was impossible. Even though the firm “educated” workers 
in the company’s expertise, there was nevertheless some 
skepticism about the new material and its requirements, 
if not rejection of them. Thus, Hennebique sometimes 
employed other agencies, depending on the skills needed 
for various projects. Obliged to consolidate structures, cover 
them or make them more resistant, on specific occasions, 
it sometimes made use of European agents such as the 
Swiss Samuel de Mollins for the restoration of the Great 
Mosque of Damascus (1894)48, but also for bridges (Tizi-
Ouzou, 1909). One of the constraints of worksites abroad lay 
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Preliminary drawings for Great Mosque 
restoration (following the fire on October 14, 
1893), Damascus (1894), Edmond Béchara, 
arch.-eng.; Samuel de Mollins, eng.; 
P. Poujoulat, cont.; Francillon et Compagnie, 
cont.: perspective view of three ceiling 
variations, elevation and longitudinal section
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in the additional costs incurred for example by the shipping 
of materials (cement, steel and wood for coffering). Charged 
to the budget of some projects, they forced the agent of the 
central office to make savings on design costs.49 But some-
times, these additional execution costs were compensated 
for by the low cost of local labor. Representing at least 
25% of the cost of establishing a structure in 1906,50 this 
“cheap” labor was then a boon for reducing costs or at least 
rebalancing them. The organization and co-ordination of a 
worksite as well as the qualification of the labor appear to 
have determined the choice of technical solutions. Calling 
on specific skills, these requirements could in certain situ-
ations be abandoned in favor of simpler solutions: “Because 
this construction will be done in Morocco, a country where 
there is no any specialist manpower to speak of, we have 
designed a second solution...”51. The absence of qualification 
therefore does not seem to be an obstacle to the method of 
construction developed by Hennebique nor to its expansion. 
This disadvantage even allowed the contractor to have addi-
tional influence during the construction phase: “An intel-
ligent site manager assisted by a good carpenter will have 
quickly transformed a few indigenous people into mixers 
of mortar.”2 
Communication about the structures erected by Henne-
bique in these countries appeared in print locally in the 
journal Les Chantiers Nord-africains (1928-1950).53 This 
illustrated periodical about construction in northern Africa 
was an important endorsement for the firm. Many articles 
praised the functional and esthetic characteristics of Henne-
bique-system buildings. From 1902, local French language 
Preliminary drawings for Great Mosque 
restoration (following the fire on October 14, 
1893), Damascus (1894), Edmond Béchara, 
arch.-eng.; Samuel de Mollins, eng.; 
P. Poujoulat, cont.; Francillon et Compagnie, 
cont.: detail, main portal
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newspapers such as Le Phare de Port-Saïd reported to the 
general public on the advantages of reinforced concrete, 
highlighting its official adoption by the Ministry for Public 
Works and even inciting its generalized use for its solidity 
and low cost.54
The journal Le Béton armé, an official organ of the firm, 
also dedicated five issues to construction in Northern Africa 
between December 1934 and April 1935. Almost exclusively 
covering Algerian constructions, these issues constitute a 
special dossier showing a range of structure types completed 
by Hennebique since the Algiers office had opened in 1894. 
The articles describe the architectonic qualities of each 
building and in particular the various businessmen involved 
in the projects. 
But the firm went beyond the level of business rhetoric, a 
genre it had mastered long before the special issues of Le 
Béton armé were published. It even engaged in political 
discourse, presenting itself as an essential ally of the 
authorities for the “industrial and commercial” develop-
ment of a territory, which moreover was a colony. The firm 
built its authority on bases other than those listed in its 
reinforced concrete process. It echoed colonialist values 
in which the spirit of conquest of the “natives” and the 
struggle against unfair competition were precepts, while it 
benefited from a quasi-monopoly in Algeria in 1935. 
Globally, Hennebique’s communication strategies abroad 
were the same as those used by the company in Belgium 
and then in France from the late 19th century. Positioning 
itself in particular against the expansion of the steel 
sectors, for example, it emphasized the mechanical qual-
ities of reinforced concrete, and in particular its resist-
ance in the event of a fire, just as François Hennebique 
had done at the turn of the century for the textile regions 
of northern France. Thus, in 1927, the journal continued 
to report on major fires, both in France and in the coun-
tries of the Mediterranean perimeter, whereas one might 
have thought that after the death of François Hennebique 
in 1921, the company might have changed its pitch. In 
this sense, the case of the Cicurel stores in Cairo is 
enlightening: the journal explains that the building had 
been entirely erected in 1912 by the Entreprise Rolin – a 
licensee in Cairo since 1904 – except for the large central 
staircase which, for purely esthetic reasons and despite 
Hennebique’s opposition, was built of wood and wrought 
iron. When the department store was hit by a fire in 1920, 
the reinforced concrete resisted, but the staircase was 
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Cicurel department store, Cairo 
(1909-1912), Émile Servin, eng.; 
Rolin et Compagnie, cont.: The pit of 
the central staircase after the fire 
on October 13, 1920
destroyed. The large void it left eloquently expressed the 
superiority of reinforced concrete over metal.
The competition between metal and concrete was played 
out in construction capacities, but also in the esthetics of 
the two materials. Hennebique’s concern for the esthetic 
aspect of its first structures abroad was what enabled it 
to compete with the steel sector – especially the firms 
Daydé, Baume & Marpent and Fives-Lille55– and thus to 
win contracts.56 A bitter battle was indeed engaged in the 
area of the erection of structures, steel appearing more 
easily to obtain the favors of public authorities responsible 
for parceling out contracts in the early 1900s.57 Besides 
the fact that reinforced concrete had not yet come into 
the public domain, the spectacular constructions of Eiffel 
for example, still present in public memory, as well as 
the recent creations of the various European steel manu-
facturers, undoubtedly contributed significantly to this 
trend. The stakes for reinforced concrete and Hennebique 
in particular were therefore to show that concrete could 
match the beauty of steel construction, while surpassing 
its mechanical capacities. One of the sales argument of the 
“first application of reinforced concrete of [its] system for 
a large bridge in Egypt”,58 the road bridge at the Gabbari 
Station in Alexandria in 1905, moreover does not lie as 
much in the calculation sheets the firm could provide, but 
in the photographs and reports of tests on bridges it had 
carried out in advance.59 All the arguments and examples 
it called upon were then likely to tilt the scales in favor of 
reinforced concrete: resistance to outside military attacks, 
examples of earlier maritime constructions, construc-
tions abroad, testimonials from administrations which had 
already ordered structures, etc.
During this period, reinforced concrete also played on its 
ability to attract architects by offering them decorative 
elements. Thus, by emphasizing the esthetic capacities of 
reinforced concrete, Hennebique succeeded in obtaining 
one of its first contracts in Northern Africa: the Arabic 
Museum and the Khedivial Library in Cairo (1895-1898). 
To sell its technical offer (building the sleepers60) to the 
investors, two possibilities were available: the economic 
argument or the esthetic argument. Against all expec-
tations, the company did not emphasize the economic 
aspect of its construction system, but the capacity of 
concrete to “decorate easily and artistically” the ceilings 
of the large rooms and lobby. Thus, it was not the archi-
tect who proposed an esthetic solution to the company, 
but the Neapolitan agent, Giovanni Narici, who suggested 
a decorative project to the architect Alfonso Maniscalco, 
to convince him to support the Hennebique system. Tacti-
cally, Marciano, the company from Cairo, had to present 
to the Egyptian Government the girderings – a rather arid 
technical element – of the most visible public rooms, in 
order to display the Neo-Mamluk style ceiling coffers. 
The economic argument appeared only later, because 
the proposed decor varied in complexity. A change in 
the quantities of material needed to complete the decor 
would cause additional expenses that the architect might 
very well have turned down.
The establishment of Hennebique in the countries of the 
Mediterranean perimeter is surely more complicated than 
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Sultan Qalawun Mosque, Cairo (1904-1905), 
restoration by Max Herz Bey, arch.; 
Émile Servin, eng.; Rolin et Padova, cont.: 
The dome under construction 
(photo by M. Reiser)
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Arabic Museum and Khedivial Library, 
Cairo (1895-1898), Alfonso Maniscalco, 
arch.; Clifton, eng.; Émile Servin, eng.; 
M. A. Moreau, cont.: Detail of the central 
portion of the main facade
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Arabic Museum and Khedivial Library, 
Cairo (1895-1898), Alfonso Maniscalco, 
arch.; Clifton, eng.; Émile Servin, eng.; 
M. A. Moreau, cont.: Elevation of 
the main facade
it appears, given the geographical extent of the zone 
and its political heterogeneity. Even though the exam-
ples listed above show a method of operation or a type 
of commission, they are the expression of an unusual 
context of creation, specific to a country at a specific 
time. Currently, the classification of the Hennebique 
archives61 is incomplete. This is an obstacle to a more 
synoptic approach to our area of study. Although the 
period of activity is clearly marked, the essential data, 
such as knowledge of the exact role of the main players 
or the chronology of the typological production in a given 
region is either missing or insufficient for us to document 
in detail the stages in the establishment of a sprawling 
but nevertheless mobile network. 
